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1. Introduction
Since its genesis in the 1930s industrial organization
economics has grown as a corpus of scientific
knowledge by two interrelated avenues:  deductive
theory and inductive empirical study of markets.  Most
work has focused on the definition of an industry or
market, the organization of such markets including the
condition of entry, the strategic conduct of incumbent
and potential entrant firms, and the performance of firms
and the overall market.  Work in this area has evolved
from rich comprehensive industry case studies called for
by Mason (1939), such as Nicholls (1941), Hoffman
(1940), and NCFM (1966), to narrowly focused,
complex econometric studies.  Ideally these econometric
studies are based upon, new, very large, disaggregate
data sets with great detail on transactions, advances in
econometrics, and extensive computing power.  Today
we estimate and test directly market and firm models
first offered in the 1930's, and subsequently refined by
theorists.
Perhaps the overriding issue in horizontal industry
analysis has been the determinants and degree of market
power.  Included in this conundrum are alternative
explanations of firm strategic advantage (increased
profits and or market position) such as real economies of
scale and scope, and product quality.  Considerably less,
but by no means trivial, work in industrial organization
has examined the vertical organization of the economy
and the internal organization of firms.
Traditionally vertical organization work is classified
into two areas:  vertical integration (Perry, 1989) and
vertical contracting or coordination (Katz, 1989).  Most
work on vertical integration has been an extension of
horizontal market analysis to determine whether market
power can be transferred via integration to neighboring
stages in a market channel, or whether integration raises
entry barriers and creates power in one or both
industries.  Work on vertical coordination has effectively
eschewed neoclassical analysis, opting for either a
Coase-Williamson transaction cost approach or an
agency theory of the firm (Hart 1995, Grossman and
Hart, 1986) framework.  Vertical coordination analysis
has typically analyzed exchange between two successive
stages in a market channel, e.g. growers and processors
or manufacturers and retailers, to determine when and
why contract coordination between a particular seller
and buyer replaces arms length transactions in market.
As we will demonstrate in this paper incentives for such
coordination increase with increasing concentration in
the food sector.
Work on the neoclassical "black box", i.e. the firm,
has also eschewed neoclassical analysis and used Coase-
Williamson transaction costs or agency theory to make
significant progress in our understanding of the
demarcation between firm and market as well as the
internal organization of firms.  Writing on the
relationship between three different approaches to
analyzing the nexus between firms and markets Demsetz
states:
Neoclassical theory is focused on specialization, not on
managed coordination.  Coase's theory is focused on
managed coordination, not on specialization.
Contemporary theory has a still different emphasis.  Its
concern is mainly with agency problems, but, it is more
closely related to Coase's theory than to neoclassical
theory because its focus is on optimal mixtures of market-
based incentives and management-based controls.
(Demsetz, 1997, p. 427)
He continues:
The firm in neoclassical theory reflects the imperatives of
the price system, not those of management; if the price
system works well, resources are allocated well.
Imperfect information, in contrast, makes the judgement
of managers and owners a source of productivity
enhancement.  The main source of management's
productivity in contemporary theory has been in its
response to agency problems.  (Demsetz, 1997, p. 428)
In addition to the analysis of shirking, opportunism,
and reputation effects within a firm's labor force and
with it trading partners in markets, agency theory has
also been used to analyze the relations between top
management, the board of directors, and stockholders.
Building on the classic work by Berle and Means (1935),
Henry Manne (1965), Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen
(1986) and others have constructed a theory of corporate
control.
1  Therein a merger or leveraged buyout are
actions in a market for corporate control that redress the
                                               
1 The separation of ownership and control dates to the advent
of the modern, limited liability corporation in England: "In
1837, when the first Limited Liability Act was passed, the
organization of joint-stock companies was regulated and the
personal liability of each shareholder was limited to the
amount of his share.  Previously, if the company went
bankrupt, the entire property of each individual shareholder
could be used to pay the company's creditors.  The new Act
caused a flood of wealth to pour into limited liability
companies, which provided much of the capital for new
industries, and London became the financial capital of the
world."  (Charlot, 1991, p. 337)Dynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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failure of shareholder elected boards to discipline top
management for poor performance.  Good management
drives out bad management or so the claim goes.  We
will critique and expand this theory to explain how
financial capitalists created market power to benefit
investors.  Examples of financial as opposed to industrial
capitalists include J.P. Morgan at the beginning and
Harry Kravis at the end of the 20
th century.
Demsetz, however, would have us look beyond the
contributions of agency theory and allocate some effort
to neoclassical theory, especially when analyzing
vertical organization issues.  He argues that:
The focus in this effort has led to the neglect of
information problems that do not involve agency
relationships…Should agency problems be the primary
guide to understanding vertical integration?  Perhaps, but
consider, for example, the role of "expertise."…The
manufacturer of commercial aircraft possesses specialized
knowledge that can be extended at little cost into the
business of maintaining older aircraft.  Vertical
integration of these two businesses is, therefore, a
practical possibility. Vertical integration of aircraft
manufacturing and airline transportation, on the other
hand, is more difficult.  Effective vending of airline
transportation to the general public requires operational
and marketing know-how not normally part of the
knowledge needed to manufacture aircraft.  The difficulty
this poses does not depend on agency problems. …The
focus on agency relationships has also led to neglect of
some useful neoclassical theorizing.  The successive-
monopoly problem, price discrimination, and price
controls, as examples, offer motives for vertical
integration not involving agency problems. (Desmetz,
1997, p. 428)
In this paper we honor Demsetz's call for a refocus
upon neoclassical theory to explain some critical issues
in the vertical organization and performance of the
economy.  This approach yields new insights and
advances new models to analyze the impact of market
power.  Specifically we go beyond the analysis of
market power within an industry such as food retailing
or a food processing industry to consider the
implications of market power in successive industries in
a market channel.  Implications include the need for
vertical coordination rather than arms length pricing in a
wholesale market to improve market performance; hence
an explanation for the decline of wholesale markets and
the rise of Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) and
category management.  Successive monopoly or
oligopoly also has a heretofore unrecognized impact on
farm to retail price transmission, and in most cases
reduces vertical pricing efficiency.  With the exception
of McCorriston, et al. (1998), Cotterill (1998, 2000) and
Dhar and Cotterill (2000), no one has specified formal
economic models to analyze the impact of
noncompetitive market channel structures, i.e. market
power at one or more stages of the system, on price
transmission.
Finally this paper is also more general in the
tradition of Mason and Hoffman.  The next section will
review, for want of a better term, Krondriatiff cycles
(Schumpeter, 1935), in the organization of the food
sector during the 20
th century.
2  The sector has
experienced growth and transformation in response to
"waves" in the advance of basic human knowledge, as
well as secondary waves in culture, social organization,
and public policy.  One of the organizing themes of this
conference is that the consumer has and will continue to
shape the organization of the food system.  Well, yes and
no.  As we will see this is true to the extent that one
equates the evolution of the consumer with economic
growth and cultural shifts observed during the 20
th
century.  There are however many other equally
important, and in certain situations more critical,
determinants of the organization and performance of the
food sector.  Demand, one half of the Marshallian
scissors, must be augmented by supply side phenomena,
including the status of competition, technology, and
public policy to have a complete picture.
The third section of this paper reviews the relatively
sparse neoclassical work on the vertical organization of
market channels.  We develop a more general
framework.  The remaining sections of the paper analyze
                                               
2 Schumpeter explains long waves of economic progress as
follows: "Historical Knowledge of what actually happened at
any time in the industrial organism, and of the way in which it
happened, reveals first the existence of what is often referred
to as the "Long Wave" … It has been worked out in more
detail by Kondratieff, and may therefore be called the
Kondratieff Cycle.  Economic historians of the nineteenth
century have unconsciously and independently testified to the
reality of the first of these waves our material allows us to
observe, viz., the cycle from about 1783 to 1842, the
"industrial revolution," …The years 1842-1897 are readily
interpreted as the age of steam and steel, particularly as the
age of the railroadization of the world.  This may sound
superficial, but it can be shown in detail that railroad
construction and work incident to it, connected with it, or
consequential upon it, is the dominant feature both of
economic change and of economic fluctuations during that
time. … Future historians finally will find no difficulty in
recognizing the initiating importance of electricity, chemistry
and motor cars for … the third Long Wave, which rose about
1897."  (Schumpeter, 1935).  Today we are clearly at the
beginning of the "internet wave" an event probably equal in
importance to the railroad wave and automobile/electricity
wave.Dynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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current and near term future issues of organization and
performance.  These include the analysis of farm to retail
price transmission in noncompetitive market channels,
the rationale and impact of leveraged buyouts, the
impact of successive monopoly/oligopoly on vertical
strategy, the rise of retail buying power including
slotting fees, and the impact of globalization on the





The food sector in the developed economies of the
U.S. and Europe has indeed been extremely dynamic.  In
1900, for the majority of North American and Western
European "consumers", food was either grown or
purchased in raw form and it was cooked over a wood
burning stove in a house with no indoor plumbing, no
mechanical refrigeration or freezing, and no electricity.
Centuries old procedures for food preservation were
commonly used: drying, salt, smoke, or storing in root
cellars.  Up to 50 percent of a household's disposable
income and probably an equal proportion of a
household's labor were needed simply to eat.  Moreover
the common diet was atrocious with an excess of salt
and fat, and a lack of fresh fruits and vegetables.  Clearly
20
th century progress in the food sector has offered more
for human welfare than progress in the sector over the
prior 2000 years.
This progress has come part and parcel with the
development of an industrial, science based food system
and the growth of advanced wealthy industrial
economies wherein consumption has clearly been
divorced from production in all industries due to
economic specialization.
The mere fact that we are dramatically more well off
today than in 1900, however, does not preclude careful
analysis of the organization of the food sector to
improve its performance.  The fields of agricultural
marketing, industrial organization analysis, and general
economic analysis have similarly grown exponentially
with the rise of the modern 20
th century economy.  This
coincidence is more than fortuitous.  To paraphrase
Thorstein Veblen, economists are engineers who tinker
and tune the price system and its corresponding set of
markets to change and improve performance.  Improved
                                               
3 A complete view of the economic evolution of the food
sector would include changes in farming including agricultural
policy and cooperative marketing as a movement to sustain
parity in economic welfare for farm families and rural
communities.  This issue begs for attention (Kristoff),
however, this paper is all ready at its limit in size.
performance is identified not only by gains in economic
efficiency but also by public goals set by governments.
Turning to Table 1 one can identify four major eras
in the evolution of the food sector since 1900. In the first
era firms and other market intermediates were small or at
best medium sized with the exceptions of a few "trusts"
in areas such as sugar and beef.  The advent of the
transcontinental railroads and commercial refrigeration
prior to 1900 had allowed the red meat, dairy and other
food industries to develop on a national or regional basis
(Chandler, 1977, Part II).  For the first time vertical
market channels of some import appeared e.g. dairy
farmer, milk assembler, rail transport, milk bottling and
distribution door to door.  Most food processing
however remained rudimentary and local/regional in
nature.  Most markets, were effectively competitive and
entrepreneurial.  The supply chain in urban areas was
run by regional or city wide wholesalers.  Commodities
dominated.  In 1900 40 percent of Americans still lived
on farms (Kristoff, 2000).
From 1920 to 1945 the first wave of science,
industrial organization, and consumer convenience hit.
Food processing by large publicly owned corporations
established national and regional brands.  The large-
scale production of these packaged goods required and
was made possible by the development of advertising in
print and on radio.  The advent of the automobile, truck
and a road system transformed the logistics of food
distribution.  In 1920 chain stores accounted for only 2-
3% of all grocery sales.  By 1930 the top 5 chains
accounted for 25% [Bain, 1968, p. 484].  Only A&P was
close to national with operations in 37 states in 1948.
Safeway was next with operations in 23 states (NCFM,
1966b, p. 347).  Since in most local markets only one or
two chains were present with multiple outlets, local
market concentration in the 1930s and 1940s was very
low, below 40% in most major cities.
These retail chains were innovators.  To a large
extent they passed on to consumers the cost savings
gained by integrating and creating large, for that era,
wholesale operations.  Product variety increased with the
advent of brands, and chains introduced private label
(their own version of the brand) during the 1920-1945
era.  Sutton (1991) argues convincingly that the advent
of commercial advertising and national brands in this era
initiated the trend towards concentration in food
manufacturing.  This was more often than not via merger
and acquisition (Hoffman 1940).
Supply chain control shifted from merchant
wholesalers to the national food manufacturers with the
tacit cooperation and support of integrated retail chains
and surviving wholesalers.  The latter moved towards
voluntary or cooperative status to capture many of theDynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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vertical and horizontal scale economies for independent,
non chain store, retailers.  These organizations also led
the independent grocery store operators quest for
government intervention via the passage of the
Robinson-Patman Act (1936) and other laws in an
attempt to ensure "a level playing field" for
independents.  Picture 1 of the A&P grocery store in
Main Street, Mystic, CT in 1940 captures the
"consumers venue" during this era.  Some may find it
surprising that nearly all of the economic issues related
to the organization and performance of the food sector
that we face today, surfaced when this was the typical
chain store.  Technology has advanced but the issues of
efficiency and power remain unchanged.
Underpinning the advances in chain store and large
scale wholesaling was the rise in per capita income
during the 1920's and the migration of Americans from
farms and urban barrios to the suburbs of Jay Gatsby (F.
Scott Fitzgerald), that Walt Disney, and Hollywood
movies soon entertained.  Refrigerators, gas or electric
stoves, and electric appliances now made cakes mixes
and others partially prepared or processed foods easy to
store and finish in the home kitchen.  Home economics
grew in tandem with the industrial food system.
The third phase in the century, one of
internationalization of the food industries spans 1945 to
1980.  Many leading food companies expanded
multinationally.  Communication and  exchange of best
practices increased.  Migration to the suburbs rapidly
accelerated and supermarkets bloomed.  The suburban
supermarket with a parking lot, self-service, and a much
broader product selection rapidly replaced the store front
on main street in cities.  The automobile became an
essential cog in the distribution channel.
With the rise of commercial network television in
the U.S. this era can truly be described as the golden age
of manufacturer brands and mass marketing of food
products.  Wholesaling and wholesale markets
commenced a long term decline in importance.  Farmer
cooperatives, many initially organized in the 1920s or
earlier, and other forms of vertical coordination, e.g. the
broiler industry, rose to dominate producer processor
relations in many commodity industries.  In many
instances the vertical coordination was complete to final
consumption via the creation of brands.  Consider, for
example, Sun Maid Raisins, SunKist Oranges, Ocean
Spray Cranberries, Welches Grape Juice, Land 'O Lakes
Butter by farmer cooperatives; and, Purdue Chicken, and
Tyson Chicken by investor owned firms.
Mergers and acquisitions in food manufacturing and
among retail chains during the 1945-1980 era
contributed to the rise of tight oligopolies in many
processing industries and local retail markets (Connor, et
al.1985; Marion, et al. 1979; NCFM, 1966b).  Branded
food manufacturers dominated the supply channels
during the 1945-1980 era, however new supermarket
chains with substantial turnover (over $500 million in
the 1960's) challenged for leadership.  Their primary
move was to expand private label offerings by
integrating back into food processing (NCFM, 1966b,
ch. 4).  Leading supermarket chains in the 1960s were
far more integrated than they are today.
The peak and demise of this bricks and mortar
strategy was the A&P WEO (Where Economy
Originates) campaign in the early 1970s (Marion, et al.
1979, p. 74).  A&P had been the leading food retail
chain since pre-supermarket days in the 1930's.  It's
national share, however, steadily eroded after the second
world war for a variety of reasons, one of which was its
overconfidence in its private label products in face of the
advance of advertised manufacturer's brands during the
era.  In a final last hurrah for backward integration A&P
built a huge 40 acre plant in Horseheads, NY for the
production of private label products, expanded other
plants and committed to building relatively small,
expensive brick supermarkets that were primarily
stocked with low cost (and perceived quality) A&P
private label products.  When the strategy clearly was
failing they instituted a nationwide price war (WEO) in
1972 and 1973.  It was one last attempt to convince
consumers that their products and services were right,
and to gain much needed market share to sustain their
production systems.  They failed because other
supermarket chains correctly perceived that consumers
wanted stores nearly twice as large, superstores with
more than 30,000 square feet, stocked with advertised
brands, nonfood items (health, and hygiene, kitchen
items, and floral) and service departments, most notably
a deli and in-store bakery.  Ergo the end of vertical
integration as a strategy by retailers, and the advent of
broad assortment retailing by supermarkets and mass
merchandisers.
During the 1945-1980 period public policy, most
notably merger enforcement, became very active in food
industries.  In the 1940's government leaders and
economists generally, and especially industrial
organization economists, harbored deep concern that the
great depression was at least in part caused by the trend
towards large corporations and tight oligopoly.  There
was a fear that tight oligopoly was replacing and/or
subverting the price system of competitive markets
(TNEC, 1941; Roosevelt, 1948; Berle and Means, 1932).
Gardiner Mean's administered price hypothesis,
counseled that large oligopolists lay off workers rather
than cut price when faced with declining demandDynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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(Means, 1935)
4.  Stocking and Watkin's (1946) had
carefully documented many global price fixing cartels
during the interwar period.  Their impact on trade and
aggregate demand was an issue.  Finally there was the
concern that economic concentration and power would
coalesce with political power as it had done in Japan,
Germany, and Italy to subvert democracy.  On the
positive side for economic concentration was the lonely
plea by Schumpeter (1949) that economic concentration
was necessary for business to be able to afford to do
research and development that would contribute to long
term economic Krondiatriff cycles and growth, thereby
avoiding another depression.
As the 1945-1980 era unrolled, economic research
and the balm of economic growth refined and generally
rejected all of these theories as causes of depressions.
Research turned to a more focused analysis on how
mergers and other strategic moves by firms in
oligopolies affect pricing efficiency and consumer
welfare.
The final 20 years of the century was an era of
globalization.  The cold war ended and capitalism as a
social as well as an economic system advanced.  The
most important transformation was the rise of a global
capital market that is a more direct and powerful
mechanism for controlling the fortunes of publicly
owned corporations, including food firms.  In this era the
hostile takeover, the leveraged buyout or the defensive
leveraged recapitalization (e.g. Kroger 1988) re-
engineered American corporations, especially food
retailers and manufacturers, in the U.S.  A similar
process is now underway in Europe with the
liberalization and merging of capital markets into the
global market.  Important components include the Euro,
the revitalization and expansion of European stock
markets as a vehicle for allocating equity capital and for
deploying consumer savings, and finally the advent of
American style investment banking to power this
"American" capitalist system forward (Andrews, 2000).
During the 1980-2000 era market concentration in
food manufacturing and retailing accelerated to high
levels (Rogers, 2000).  Curiously vertical integration
between the two stages declined dramatically, especially
for food retailers.  This polarization or specialization,
however, was accompanied by a rise in retailer
controlled brands produced under contract in a tightly
coordinated fashion by manufacturers.  In Europe
control of the supply chain is clearly lodged at the retail
level (Bell, 2000).  Given the lack of commercial TV
advertising, and consequently weak, more fragmented
                                               
4 For an excellent review of Means hypothesis and the
literature that has subsequently addressed it see Greer, 1992.
brands in each county, retail brands and channel control
has always tended to be stronger in Europe.
In the U.S. supermarket retailers during this period
rapidly moved towards superstores and even larger
combination food-drug emporiums, and super centers -
full scale supermarkets combined with a discount mass
merchandise operation that sells everything from lawn
and garden to car repair, to home fixtures and clothing.
The top six supermarket retailers (Kroger, Safeway,
Albertsons, Royal Ahold, WalMart and Del Haize) now
control over 50% of supermarket sales, up from 32% as
recent as 1992 (Cotterill, 2000).  This increase in buyer
concentration and increased focus on retail labels has
clearly shifted control of supply channels towards
retailers.
At the end of the century a new distribution channel,
firms that specialize in Internet based home delivery of
groceries has surfaced.  Although many see this as the
harbinger of new competition, we question whether they
will survive another 12 months.
5  The stock market was
the major source of equity capital, via IPOs, for these
new firms.  The stock market performance of Peapod,
Webvan, Streamline, and Home Grocers has been
disastrous (Appendix A).  Investors in these IPOs have
lost more than 80% of their capital to date and the trend
clearly suggests a complete loss.  Peapod, the largest
and oldest Internet grocers lost $28.5 million in 1999 on
sales of $73.1 million (Food Institute, 2000, p. 4).  At its
initial public offering in June 1997 its stock traded at
$11.25 per share.  On April 12, 2000 its stock traded at
$2.81 per share. On April 14 Royal Ahold purchased
51% of Peapod.  Ahold also recently purchased the
second largest food service firm in the U.S.  Perhaps
they see synergies, but we remain most skeptical of
internet and warehouse based home delivery business
models.
Until one can establish a dense distribution network
in a local market area, the genius of the supermarket
model, getting consumers to do the final picking and
distribution of products, will dominate for all but the
most wealthy consumers.  Moreover those probably will
be most efficiently supplied by Peapod's old model,
internet ordering but delivery from a local supermarket.
Ahold, in the affluent Northeast corridor, is well situated
for adding this value added service to its supermarkets.
The warehouse based distribution model that Peapod is
converting to may be history.
                                               
5 Internet ordering of groceries from local large supermarkets,
and the Priceline.com offering of low priced groceries, a very
clever adaptation of consumer promotion and trade programs,
may be successful.Dynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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During the last 20 years of the century food
expenditures is a share of disposable income have
continued their secular decline to less than 10% in the
U.S.  Eating out has increased so that consumer
expenditures for away from home food now rival
purchases from grocery stores for home meals.
As we move into the 21
st century globalization is
accelerating.  American food manufacturers and
European supermarket retailers are taking the lead
(Ramsey, 2000).  In its 1986 LBO Safeway sold its
substantial UK and Australian operations, keeping only
its strong dominant position in Western Canada.  No
other U.S. food retailers, except very recently WalMart,
with its move into Germany and UK Supermarkets
(ASDA) has foreign operations of any size.
3. Expanding the Neoclassical Theory of Vertical
Organization and Performance
It is nothing new or startling nowadays for us not to
supply our own needs for soap.  Nor does it seems strange
that many of us could not even describe the process of
making soap.  We do not feel ashamed of not
understanding the intricacies involved in manufacturing
steel or assembling an automobile.  On the contrary, we
take distinct pride in the fact that we do not need to know
how to make soap, steel, or automobiles.  We are glad to
be able to depend on others to do such things for us and to
rest content in the knowledge that they are doing a much
better job than we could.  Ours is not an era like that of
150 years ago, when self-sufficiency was the order of the
day.  One of the distinct marks of the economic progress
of our age is rooted in the fact that inventive genius has
given us a civilization of specialists.  (Adams and
Traywick, 1948, p. 3)
This quote from Walter Adams and Horace Gray
points to our path.  As the parent of teenagers, now I
know why it is clearly not cool to be self sufficient or to
learn about dull topics.  The next generation is simply
following the specialization dictum of economics.  We
start with Adam Smith and Benjamin Franklin, proceed
to George Stigler and then expand Stigler's model.  The
fundamental questions are what determines the
organization of a food marketing channel into firms and
markets, and how does a particular organization effect
the channel's performance.
Adam Smith keenly observed that specialization was
the key to economic progress and that it was limited by
the size of the market.
As it is the power of exchanging that gives occasion to the
division of labour, so the extent of this division must
always be limited by the extent of that power, or, in other
words, by the extent of the market.  When the market is
very small, no person can have any encouragement to
dedicate himself entirely to one employment, for want of
the power to exchange all that surplus part of the produce
of his own labour, which is over and above his own
consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's
labour as he has occasion for. … In the lone houses and
very small villages which are scattered about in so desert
a country as the Highlands of Scotland, every farmer must
be butcher, baker and brewer for his own family. (Smith,
1776, Book 1, Ch. 3)
For food industries to form, i.e. the butcher, the
baker, and the brewer, they had to be spun off from the
farm and town homes.  The market for such specialized
activity had to be enlarged via the growth of cities
(urbanization), the improvement of transportation, and
the reciprocal development of trade for agricultural and
other products so that exchange among all persons could
occur.  This latter point is often unappreciated, but
critical for ultimate performance.  Only those who work
in the exchange economy benefit and they do so relative
to their productivity and power position.  This issue of
parity for agriculture in this industrial system has been
and remains a perennial concern.
Smith commented at length on the great importance
of cheap water versus expensive or nonexistent land
transportation in his day.  (What goods could bear the
expense of land carriage between London and
Edinburgh, between London and Calculta?)  Since his
time we have had several transportation and
communication advances that have expanded our ability
to specialize, e.g. railroads, automobiles, airplanes,
telephone, radio, television and the internet (Chandler,
1977).  These and other new technologies have also
created entirely new industries and have transformed the
production technology of old industries in addition to
simply making the market larger so specialization could
occur within the old technology.
Commenting on Smith's specialization due to truck,
barter, and exchange, Benjamin Franklin, a citizen of a
non industrial, agrarian and frontier economy, quickly
appreciated what Alfred Marshall called external
economies and what we now routinely call
infrastructure.
Manufactures, where they are in perfection, are carried on
by a multiplicity of hands, …If by royal munificence, and
an expense that the profits of the trade alone would not
bear, a complete set of good and skillful hands are
collected and carried over [to the U.S.], they find so much
of the system imperfect, so many things wanting to carry
on the trade to advantage, so many difficulties to
overcome, and the knot of hands so easily broken by
death, dissatisfaction, and desertion, that they and their
employers are discouraged altogether, and the projectDynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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vanishes into smoke.  (Franklin as quoted in V.S. Clark,
1949, p. 152)
The division of labor is not a quaint practice of
eighteenth-century pin factories; it is a fundamental
principle of economic organization.  In the present
instance, the organization of food industries depends
upon our human capital infrastructure as well as the
physical infrastructure of the economy.  These change
over time.
George Stigler (1951) is the only economist to
squarely address the issue of vertical market channel
organization within the confines of neoclassical theory
of the firm and market equilibrium.  Perry (1989)
acknowledges that Stigler's effort was limited to his
short 1951 article and 3 or 4 subsequent pieces have
attempted to test or expand Stigler's theory.
Stigler introduces his theory by explaining that the
firm is portioned among production processes rather
than the usual input market configuration i.e. the
textbook example of production isoquants in capital and
labor space.  In his basic model he ignores the possibility
that costs for one process are related to costs of the other
distinct processes.  This means that one can derive a cost
function for each process that is only a function of
output.  Finally he assumes fixed proportion (but not
constant returns to scale) production so that one can
draw all cost functions on one graph with final output as
the quantity index on the X axis.
Figure 1, reproduced from Stigler (1951) illustrates
the theory for a firm with 3 distinct production
processes.  Note that the U-shaped average cost for the
firm is the sum of the 3 process cost functions.  Process
Y1 has increasing returns.  Process
 Y2 has decreasing
returns, and process Y3 has both to produce U-shaped
curve.  A critical question is when will Y1 splinter from
this firm, and presumably other firms in this industry, to
become a separate industry?
Stigler answers that at a given time this process may
be too small to support a specialized firm or firms.  He
states:
The sales of the product may be too small to support a
specialized merchant; the output of a by-product may be
too small to support a specialized fabricator; the demand
for market information may be too small to support a
trade journal.  The firm must the perform these functions
for itself. (Stigler, 1951, p. 188)
This proves Adam Smith's theorem that the division of
labor is limited by the size of the market.
As the economy, and in particular this industry
grows, the magnitude of the function subject to
increasing returns may become large enough to permit a
firm to specialize in producing it.  This new firm may
initially be a monopoly but its limit price would be
determined by the old industry's ability to revert to in-
house production.  With growth over time output
expands until process Y1 also experiences decreasing
returns and then one might see entry into this new
industry and a trend towards a competitive structure.
This is the reasoning for Stigler's implicit competitive
economy.
6  Imperfect competition exists, subject to a
limit price, only until economic growth deconcentrates
the new industry.  Lest one think we not need an
expanded theory, when have we observed such industrial
deconcentration with growth?
Note in Figure 1 that if the spin off produces Y1 at a
cost equal to the horizontal dotted line then the firm that
does processes Y3 and Y2 enjoys the new lower average
cost curve given by the dotted shift in AC.  The spin off
not only reduces costs, it reduces optimal scale.  Again a
curious prediction, counter to what we have experienced
in this century.  Economic growth has not led to lower
optimum scale in industry as spin-offs have created new
and large, relative to the market, optimum scale
industries.  Consider for example the optimum sized
farm over the 20
th century.
Stigler also notes that outsourcing of production
could also occur for Y2, the process with decreasing
returns.  In this case economic growth and spin off
increases optimal scale.  An example of this effect is
food manufacturing companies that have dismantled
brand marketing units and outsourced individual
components such as focus group research, and
econometric analysis of demand to smaller boutique
firms.  Outsourcing of advertising programs may go this
way but more often it seems to be subject to increasing
returns because it is usually awarded to large-scale
advertising agencies rather than boutiques.
But for the fleeting possibility of monopoly, Stigler's
theory focuses only on costs and implicitly assumes that
the least cost combination determines the market channel
structure. Baligh and Richartz (1967) and other logistics
oriented analysts have expanded this functional cost
based analysis, but none generalize the model to
                                               
6 Figure 1 is an exact reproduction of Stigler's figure.  Note
that price, not dollars or costs, is on the Y  axis.  Stigler
clearly maintains that these cost curves determine price, but he
does not explicitly include a demand curve, nor does this say
how these cost curves determine industry supply.  No
equilibrium price is identified in the figure.  Stigler's theory is
incomplete unless one provides his implicit competitive
markets assumption and then identifies price as the LR
equilibrium price that occurs at the minimum point of the
average cost curve.Dynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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consider imperfect competition and market power as a
determinant, or a result of vertical channel structure.
Stigler's theory can be expanded to provide a richer
understanding issues that affect the organization and
performance of the global food sector.  His theory is
driven by output related scale effects and the size of the
market.  Clearly other factors, in total, are more
important. Table 2 lists all factors that influence the
vertical and horizontal organization of industry.  It also
briefly identifies their impact.  The first set contains the
classic factors that Smith cited as determinants of the
extent of the market.  Economic growth, the growth of
cities, transportation, and communication all increase
incomes via increased economic specialization and
exchange.  The larger markets that result from advances
in these areas make it economic to spin off functions into
new industries.  Also one can develop entirely new
market channels, a possibility neglected by Stigler.
Examples of the latter include convenience food stores
versus supermarkets versus mass merchandisers versus
internet home delivery.
Technical progress, a factor neglected by Stigler and
also Perry (1989) in his review of vertical integration,
has to be ranked as the single most important
determinant of economic organization.
7  Food industry
organization has changed due to advances in agricultural
and food processing equipment, biological sciences,
chemistry, pharmaceuticals, computers, optical scanners,
and yes, the social sciences including marketing.
Technological advances have lowered the cost of
production, created new products, improved the quality
of older products, created new industries and new market
channels.  Examples for the last two include the rise of
the data utilities, A.C. Neilsen and Information
Resources Inc., the artificial insemination industry for
dairy cattle, the frozen food industry, and the chilled
food industry.
Changes in culture and social structure via their
effect on the work force and consumer demand also have
a major impact on economic organization.  The changing
roles of men, women and children, minorities and senior
citizens, are important, as is the value of leisure time.
These shifts create demand for new products, diverse
marketing channels that offer different mixes of
                                               
7 Perry states: "Technological economies may be an important
determinant of vertical integration in some industries.
However, they will not be a central topic of this chapter.  In
the theoretical discussions, we will generally presume that
firms have integrated so as to internalize technological
economies.  This allows us to focus upon the more interesting
economic reasons for vertical integration." (Perry, 1989, p.
185)
convenience, value, and quality.  As the labor force has
changed the optimal deployment of labor has also
affected vertical and horizontal organization of the food
sector.  Consider, for example, that the continued growth
of the fast food restaurant channel may depend on
seniors as well as young workers.  Consider also the role
of immigrant farm labor in the development of the
corporate farm fruit and vegetable industries, the current
role of immigrant labor at relatively low wages in the
meat packing industry after the unions were broken
8, and
working moms preference for ready prepared foods, take
out, or the food court at the mall.
4. The Triumph of Capital Markets:  Mergers,
Leveraged Buyouts and their Impact on Performance
An unrecognized determinant of food industry
organization is the recent development since 1980 of a
deep and unfettered global capital market.  The stock
market performance for leading U.S. and European food
manufacturers, retailers, and startup Internet grocery
firms are graphed in charts in the Appendix.  Even a
cursory examination of these gives great insight into the
relative performance of these three groups and the
impact of financial moves on particular firms.  Compare,
for example, the chart for RJR Nabisco, the victim of the
most famous leveraged buyout (LBO) of the century, to
the charts of other firms.  Nabisco is now for sale as a
downsized, stagnant business.
9
Stock prices rise for many reasons.  Fundamental
factors are a drop in investors required rate of return and
growth in the earnings stream.  Growth in earnings can
arise from growth of the company or an increase in
market power.  For market power to fuel a steady rise in
stock price it must also be increasing over time.  A one
shot increase in market power would only cause a single
increase.  Firms that possess market power thus may
have constant or even decreasing stock prices if
prospects have been squandered (See Nabisco and
Kelloggs).
The invention of junk bonds by Michael Milken,
Drexel Burham and Lambert, and soon copied by other
investment bankers, enabled takeover artists such as
Henry Kravis, Carl Ichahn, and the Haft family to
                                               
8 See Cohen, 1998, New York Times and Bartlett and Steele,
1998,  Time, for stories on the reorganization of the meat
packing industry, the role of immigrant labor, and the related
demise of family farm agriculture.
9 See McCauley, et al., (1999) for an excellent case study
chapter on RJR Nabisco.  They conclude, after careful
analysis, that the only additional value created by the merger
was the 784 million dollars of fees collected by the organizers
of the LBO. ( pp. 139-142)Dynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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finance leveraged buyouts of large publicly held
corporations in the 1980s.  These financial as opposed to
industrial capitalists (Veblen, 1919) became very, very
rich from the restructuring of industries.  In the 1980s
mergers, LBOs, or defensive leveraged recapitalizations
affected 81% of the sales of the top 20 supermarket
chain (Cotterill 1993, p. 164). Safeway's 1986 LBO by
Kohlberg Kravis and Roberts (KKR) and Kroger's 1988
defensive recapitalization are two that were very
successful for investors.  (See the stock performance
charts for them in the Appendix).
Michael Jensen, the intellectual god father of LBOs,
explained that corporate management should not have
discretionary control over their firm's free cash flow
because they tend to reinvest it in the business at rates
below stockholders' required rate of return, i.e. their next
best alternative in the stock market.  Leveraging the firm
requires managers to pay free cash flow out to junk bond
holders who can their deploy their earnings elsewhere.
Stockholders in the leveraged firm can reduce their risk
by purchasing junk and investment grade debt securities
in the firm to construct whatever particular "strip
security" and risk return ratio they desire (Jensen, 1986).
More important, however is the fact that, with this
financial innovation, stockholders are now assured that
management is pushing relentlessly for cash flow and its
most important subcomponent, profits.
What is wrong with this significant tightening of
capital market supervision via corporate raiders,
mergers, and internal leveraging via debt to buy back
stock?  Well, maybe not much on balance if the exercise
of market power is left out of the analysis.  Then it
clearly constitutes a drive for technical and
organizational efficiency and these financial engineering
moves will succeed or fail based on their contribution to
organization efficiency and technical efficiency.  Agency
theory works. The success of restructuring, however, in
most instances depended on the breaking of unions or
wage give backs, discounts, slotting fees and other give
backs by suppliers, and higher prices paid by consumers.
In short the exercise of market power was crucial for
their success.
The debate on the merits of LBO's, however,
focused on a larger issue in political economy.  Recall
that in the late 1980's and early 1990's many observers,
including James Fallows, who at the time was an editor
of Atlantic and wrote a book on the Japanese economic
miracle, predicted the demise of Anglo-American market
capitalism and the triumph of managed economies.  At
one point Michael Porter, in the employ of the top blue
chip American companies, completed a white paper
study that condemned LBO's and hostile takeovers as
shortsighted demands for immediate earnings at the
expense of long term profits that came from long term
investments (Porter, 1992).  Porter extolled the virtues of
managed capitalism in Germany and feared that stock
market "inefficiencies" often depressed company prices
below their long run value.  Investors seemed only
interested in the next few quarters earnings, without
considering long term gains.  Such "dumped companies"
were according to Porter, doing the right thing by
looking long term at the expense of short run profits.  If
you detect a resurfacing of Schumpeter's 1949 defense of
large corporations for progress in R&D you are correct.
In a managed capitalism, e.g. where a family, or a
foundation as in the Kellogg case, or a bank as in
Germany or Japan, has sufficient control to keep the
wolves at bay, Porter argued forcefully that the firm will
perform better long term.
10  Note that this improvement
in performance can come from the exercise of market
power, as done in Japan's Keiretsu, as well as from
superior dynamic efficiency (Strom, 2000).
In retrospect, the re-engineering of American
corporations was accelerated by LBO and hostile
takeovers.  The drive to maximize shareholder value in
the short run has clearly triumphed over the Japanese,
European, and Kellogg model of corporate control.
Michael Jensen seems closer to "the truth", or at least
superior stock market performance long term as well as
short term, than Michael Porter.  Economic growth also
has been superior with steady expansion in the U.S.,
recession in Japan and stagflation in Europe through
most of the 1990s.  Thus we now see Germany and other
developed economies moving to the Anglo-American
model of deep and unfettered capital markets (Andrews,
Daley, Strom).
Our point, however, is that Jensen's model ignored
the key role market power played in the process.  This
transformation has had an impact on income distribution
and consumer welfare.  Europeans, rightly so, are uneasy
that their social democratic societies will be dismantled
in pursuit of American efficiency and power by large
global or at least pan European Corporations (Andrews,
Daley).  Just as in the late 1800's when investment
bankers such as J.P. Morgan "rationalized" industries by
building trusts to make production more profitable via
the avoidance of competition and the exercising of
power against input suppliers, investment bankers in the
late 1900's also put power as well as efficiency into the
reorganization effort.  For example, when Safeway went
LBO with KKR, its new highly leveraged position
                                               
10 See Allen and Gale (2000) for a very good book that does
an in depth analysis of the alternative financial systems
including their implications for corporate governance.  They
cover the U.S., U.K., Japan, France and Germany.Dynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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succeeded because management's threat to sell unionized
divisions if they did not consent to wage cuts was now
credible.  The high price KKR paid for Safeway could
only be covered if the firm could get wage give backs.
The first division, Little Rock, resisted and was promptly
sold to nonunion operators.
11  Workers in other divisions
then gave in.  Management's options were constrained
by the financial structure and hence credible.  Either
labor and other input suppliers accepted cuts or Safeway
went bankrupt.
A similar interaction between capital market
structure and market power in product markets also
occurred with output price (Bolton and Scharfstein,
1990).  Chevalier, in fact documents that LBO
supermarket retailers raised prices to increase short term
cash flow (Chevalier 1995a, 1995b).
In nearly all LBO's a critical short term consequence
is that there is absolutely no or very little internal cash
flow available for investment in the business.  (Recall
Michael Jensen's insistence that it be paid out.)
Moreover these highly leveraged firms cannot easily
raise capital by issuing more debt or selling more stock.
The short term game contradicts Jensen's model.  Firms
must de-leverage as quickly as possible by merger
and/or divestiture so they can get back to investing in
their business.  Otherwise they lose market share to
unleveraged competitors that can invest and expand.
Safeway's 1986 LBO confirms this.  Safeway market
share in Washington D.C., for example dropped from
24.6% in 1985 to 23.1% in 1991.  Meanwhile Giant's
share exploded from 33.2% in 1985 to 43.4% in 1991
(Cotterill, 1993, p. 178).
Leveraged firms typically saw horizontal mergers as
a quick route to pricing power.  Safeway acquired Vons
in 1988.  Stop and Shop, a KKR LBO was acquired by
Royal Ahold, owner of Edwards, the number two chain
in New England behind Stop and Shop in 1996.
Pathmark, a firm hobbled by LBO debt recently tried to
merge with Royal Ahold Edwards, their primary
competition in the metro New York area, but was
stopped by FTC scrutiny (Orgel 1999, Cotterill 1999a,
Cotterill et al., 1999).  Prevented from monetizing the
excessive and high value that the LBO put on the firm,
Pathmark is now restructuring its debt, in effect forcing
junk bond holders to absorb losses because the
efficiencies and power plays that they believed could
                                               
11 The Safeway spin-off Harvest Stores ultimately went
bankrupt and it share dropped from 23% in 1993 to zero.
Kroger aggressively expanded and in 1999 had a dominant
position with 51% of the market (Franklin, 2000). The
financial capitalists certainly would approve of this divide and
conquer approach to food marketing.
cover their cash flow demands when they did the LBO
are not available.
The federal and state antitrust agencies now take a
much tougher stance towards bailing out financial
capitalists than they did in the heyday of LBOs in the
1980's.  Industry executives now believe that their
enforcement stance is even tougher than the 1990's
where divestitures often allowed mergers to go forward
(Orgel, 1999, Zwieback, 2000).
5. Successive Monopoly/Oligopoly Requires a New
Approach to Farm to Retail Price Transmission
Somewhat endogenous, but important in its own
right for the vertical organization and performance of the
food sector is prior organization.  Our basic point is that
the trend towards tight oligopoly in successive stages of
a market channel will influence the continued evolution
of this channel's structure and its performance.  Research
in agricultural economics on cost pass through rates
(CPTR), for example, has concentrated almost
exclusively on homogeneous products and models that
assume for tractability that the market channel is a single
industry with competitive firms (e.g. Gardner, 1975;
Heien, 1980; Kinnucan and Forker 1987). Recently
McCorriston, et al. (1998) relax the competitive
assumption, but they continue to maintain the single
stage (industry) and homogeneous product assumptions.
Outside of agricultural economics Ashenfelter, et al.
(1998) analyze two types of cost shocks–industry wide
and firm specific but they do so only in a residual
demand framework for a single stage or industry.  Here
we advance the theory and empirical analysis by
introducing a more disaggregate structural model with
firms in a two stage (industry) market channel.  We
identify cross firm price shocks and corresponding pass
through rates as well as industry and firm specific rates.
Given an oligopolistic market structure, a firm specific
shock not only influences that firm’s own price level; it
also causes other firms to react to that price and change
their prices (Cotterill 1994, 1998; Cotterill, et al. 2000).
The farm to retail transmission of prices, i.e. the CPTR,
is affected by the structure of the market channel.
Assume horizontal competition both at the
processing and retail level (a two stage channel) is Nash
in prices. Assume also Bertrand price competition exists
among retailers. To capture the vertical nature of
competition between processors and retailers, we specify
three different games: supermarkets with upstream
integration (complete vertical coordination game), a two
stage vertical Nash model where each supermarket
chooses an exclusive processor and processors and
retailers maximize profit simultaneously by deciding onDynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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the wholesale and retail price, and a vertical Stackleberg
game where in the second stage of the game a retailer
decides on the profit maximizing price given a wholesale
price and in the first stage of the game a processor
maximizes profit by choosing the wholesale price taking
into account the reaction function of the retailer.
This model assumes that one has retail data for
individual chain supermarkets  (IRI key account data). It
also assumes vertical dyadic relationships between
processors and retailers,  i.e. each retailer deals with one
exclusive processor.  This is clearly not the case, and is a
shortcoming. Other research on vertical structural
models has the same constraint (e.g. Kadiyali et al. 1996,
1998). One can allow for more processor interactions via
vertical competition for customers by disaggregating the
commodity into branded and private label (Cotterill,
Putsis and Dhar, 2000). One could continue such
disaggregation to the brand level. Then the model would
be more disaggregate than the typical firm since a brand
is supplied to more than one retailer. In these
disaggregate models, modeling competition among
processors as a vertical game through retailers rather
than a direct horizontal game among processors at the
wholesale level seems sufficient and reasonable.
Processors compete with each other through retailers in
the retail market for the sale of their products.
Let the demand functions of the retailers be the
following:
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Processor level demand is derived from the retail
level demand specifications given retail conduct and
margin. To derive these processor level demand
functions different conjectures are assumed at the
processor level concerning retailer reactions. These
conjectures can be perceived as assumptions by the
processors about retailer pricing behavior given a
wholesale price. For the vertical integration (full
coordination) game we need no vertical conjecture
assumptions because the channel has only one industry–
integrated retailers.








where:  1 w  and  2 w are the wholesale prices received by
the processors.
So, the retailers’ profit functions can be written as:
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Following Choi (1991), in the Vertical Nash game, a
linear mark-up at retail is conjectured by the processor








where:  1 r  and  2 r  are the linear mark-ups at the retail
level.
In the Stackleberg game, each processor develops a
conjecture from the first order condition of the retailer.
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We assume that each manufacturer only knows its
own retailer’s reaction function and that the
manufacturer ignores impacts of its wholesale price




















We simplify the processor level marginal cost function








where: m is the industry specific marginal cost
component and m1 and m2 are the processor specific cost
components.
So, the processors profit functions can be written as:
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[7(a)-(b)]
Using the profit maximizing first order conditions
both at the processing and retail level we derive the costDynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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pass through rate (CPTR) equations. They are presented
in Table 3.  Note that they are only functions of the
demand parameters.  This is due to the constant marginal
cost assumption. Slade (1995), Choi (1991), Cotterill et
al. (2000) and others have modeled vertical interaction
by assuming that retail sales are made by a monopolist
that is supplied by more than one manufacturer. Here we
assume the converse (multiple retailers each supplied by
a single manufacturer). If in fact our retailers are
monopolists then the transmission rates in Table 3 for
changes in processor’s marginal cost are identical for an
industry wide change such as the change in the price of a
farm commodity, and for a firm specific cost shift, such
as a change in labor costs or change due to merger
related efficiencies. In the full coordination or vertical
integration game we have one monopoly rather than two
successive monopolies.  With linear demand and
constant marginal costs one identically obtains a CPTR
= 1/2. For Stackleberg one obtain 1/4 and for vertical
Nash one obtains 1/3. Thus the cost pass through rate, or
what some call the farm to retail price transmission rate,
is a function of the strategic game played, and it is less
than the CPTR for perfect competition, which is 1, in
this linear demand, constant cost model.
Relaxing the retail monopoly assumption in Table 3
produces cost pass through rates that are functions of the
retail demand parameters. Now firm specific and
industry wide cost shocks assume different values.  The
degree of vertical competition still affects the cost pass
these rate.  This model clearly is suggestive rather than
definitive.  It demonstrates an important new avenue for
research on an old issue (Means 1935) that once again is
becoming important, the impact of concentrated food
manufacturing and retailing industries on vertical price
flexibility, which has a great impact on consumer and
farmer welfare.
12
The lack of vertical price flexibility means that
consumers don’t get the signal to switch to other
products when supplies are short and they don’t get the
signal to use more of this product when supply is long.
Farmers suffer because their supply condition is ignored.
And given rapid technological progress and trade
liberalization over supply tends to be the norm. Hog
prices fell 39% from September 1997 to September
1998, but retail pork prices for the same period dropped
                                               
12 Means and subsequent researchers (Greer, 1992) focused on
the impact of shifts in demand and inflation on price flexibility
in a given industry.  Here the focus is somewhat different.  We
are analyzing supply side shocks and the flexibility of prices at
successive stages in a marketing channel to supply side
shocks.  As such our analysts is a supply side version of the
Means administered price hypothesis.
only 1.5% (Tevis, p. 49).  A similar problem exists for
navel oranges.  To raise public knowledge of the
inflexible retail price problem Western Grocers
publishes weekly farm and retail navel oranges prices on
its website, http://www.wga.com.  Writing on this issue
a Los Angeles Times reporter declares:
It's been a punishing year for most California orange
growers.  But you'd never know it by checking out the
produce aisle.  Although prices paid to farmers for this
season's big crop of navel oranges have plunged,
supermarket prices in many cases have jumped outpacing
even last year when a freeze wiped out two-thirds of the
crop.  Quality problems and competition from imports
have helped drive down farm prices for navel oranges to
their lowest levels in years, as little as 6 cents a pound
according to the Department of Agriculture.  Meanwhile,
the major Los Angeles-area supermarkets this week were
charging 89 cents to 99 cents a pound for the fruit.  The
retail price for March is averaging $1.01, according to the
Western Growers Association, a produce trade group.
(Fulmer, 2000)
6. Shifting Power Balances Drive New Coordination
Programs: The U.S. Example
Successive monopoly creates other problems in
addition to stagnant or depressed price transmission.  As
we show below, food retailers and manufacturers as well
as farmers and consumers suffer from the inefficiency of
successive monopoly.  Yes, this is correct, everyone
loses when successive monopoly exists in a market
channel. But do we actually have successive
monopoly/oligopoly in the U.S. and Europe?  Consider
the U.S.
In the 1980s leading food-manufacturing firms
enjoyed powerful market positions with strongly
differentiated brands supported by significant
advertising expenditures. Food manufacturing industries
such as carbonated beverages, breakfast cereal, and beer
are tight oligopolies that sell highly differentiated brands
that have reasonably inelastic (-1.5 to -3.0) brand level
demand curves at retail (Tellis, 1988; Cotterill, et al.
1996; Langan and Cotterill, 1994; Langan 1997; Ma
1997; Nevo, 1997; Cotterill and Haller 1997).  The
observed brand inelasticity is primarily due to product
differentiation, however, some is also due to tacitly
coordinated pricing, i.e. price followship tends to reduce
brand elasticities (Cotterill, et al. 2000).  Consumer pull
advertising and promotion by the brand manufacturer
reduces any bargaining power of buying groups
(Cotterill, 1997, Gerstner and Hess, 1991).  Consumers
want the brand so retailers must carry it.  Thus eachDynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
Food Marketing Policy Center Research Report No. 53 13
brand tends to be a monopoly; i.e. food manufacturers
face brand level demand curves that have sufficient
slope to allow profitable pricing above marginal cost.
Retailers also have market power in the local
markets where they sell products due to high seller
concentration in such local markets (Marion et al. 1979,
Weiss, 1989, Cotterill, 1986, 1999a, Foer, 1999, Cotterill
et al., 2000).  The following quote from Mark Husson, a
leading Wall Street analyst of the industry, very bluntly
states how supermarkets must continue to expand their
gross and net margins by expanding their market power.
He describes the exercise of power as the "gross-margin
miracle".  Moreover his view of the manufacturers and
retailers battle for channel control squares with the
analysis presented below in this paper.
what has to happen (for stock prices to increase) is it has
to become obvious to the (stock) market that supermarket
retailers are developing pricing power inside their
marketplaces and that there is a structural kind of seismic
shift going on in this country in the whole of fast-moving
consumer-goods distribution in favor of food retailers,
because that's the only way you're going to keep gross
margin continuing to move forward.
    If you can find that pricing power and define it
somehow as maybe the manufacturer or the consumer
losing power; with better organized, more rational
competition and more rational pricing, … and if the
retailers are developing this pricing power from both
sides, along with private brands - and taking control of
categories is part of that - then I think there is still some
real internal momentum inside the group, which despite
the lack of inflation can keep this gross-margin miracle
still moving forward.  (Supermarket News, 1999)
Since food retailing is a slow growing business,
gross margin expansion via increased exercise of market
power is the only fundamental strategy available to
increase stock prices.  In conclusion, we now have a
food system that is predominantly served by powerful
food manufacturers selling to powerful food retailers.
The same is true in Europe.  The successive monopoly
model of the distribution channel captures the essence of
the channel coordination problem in the U.S. and in
individual European countries.
Spengler (1950) was the first to analyze the impact
of successive monopoly on channel coordination and
economic efficiency.  Figure 2 can be used to explain the
problem.
13 Dr is the retailers demand curve. MRr is the
corresponding retail marginal revenue curve.  If we
assume, without loss of generality and for ease of
                                               
13 This analysis of double marginalization to explain formally
the role of trade promotions and private labels in the food
system was first presented in Cotterill,et al. (2000).
illustration, that the retailer has a fixed cost of retailing
and that the only variable cost is the purchase of the
product Q, then the retailers marginal cost is the
manufacturer price, w.  Since a profit maximizing
retailer always equates marginal revenue and marginal
cost (MRr = w) the retailers marginal revenue curve is
the demand curve for Q at the manufacturer level.  The
manufacturer therefore equates the marginal revenue of
the retailers input demand curve (MRm) to its marginal
cost of manufacturing the product.  In other words, the
manufacturer computes the marginal revenue of the
retailer’s marginal revenue, hence the name double
marginalization.  In Figure 6 the profit maximizing
manufacturer offers quantity q2 at price p1 = w, and the
profit maximizing retailer sells this quantity at price p2.
This is the Vertical Nash, "arms length pricing," solution
of the previous section.  If the two firms integrated the
new single monopolist would maximize profits by
lowering price to p1 and selling q1.  This is the fully
coordinated solution of the previous section.  The
integrated firm’s total profits are greater than the profits
of the two successive monopolists.
The implications of this double marginalization
phenomena are very real for the US food marketing
system today.  Food manufacturers and food retailers,
can in fact, increase their profits if they discard
independent (vertical Nash) pricing practices and talk to
each other to coordinate pricing and other terms of trade.
The vertical Stackleberg and full coordination games of
the prior section are two possibilities. The double
marginalization model predicts that vertical coordination
will increase channel profits and lower prices to
consumers.  This is a very rare win-win situation in
economics, the “dismal science” of trade-offs!  A shift
from 2 monopolies to 1 monopoly is good for everyone.
Another possibility that is better for farmers and
consumers but worse for the middlemen is competition
at both manufacturing and retailing.  Of course, this is
the goal of public policy, including antitrust.
With this economic model one can begin to
understand strategic moves such as the efficient
consumer response (ECR) program with its everyday
low pricing (EDLP) component. ECR moves to improve
the logistical flow of products through the system, such
as just-in-time inventory management procedures, have
been successful because they reduce cost.  However, one
of the largest projected savings due to the innovation of
ECR was related to the elimination of stop-go price
promotions via the establishment of everyday low prices
(EDLP) throughout the food system.  EDLP has not
worked and savings due to smoother product flow
haven’t accrued.  EDLP has failed in the United States
precisely because as implemented to date it has tended toDynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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be a vertical Nash pricing program.  Trade promotion
programs on the other hand reduce double
marginalization in the channel.
Consider Figure 3.  Assume that the manufacturer is
the channel captain and as much initiates a trade
promotion.  The manufacturer can offer product to the
retailer on the condition that it be promoted at price p1
the channel profit-maximizing price.  To obtain the
retailers cooperation, the manufacturer need only lower
w to a level that increases the retailer’s profits from the
non-promoted level.  Figure 3 illustrates a trade
promotion's impact on prices and profits.  At the non-
promoted retail price level, p2, the manufacturer has
profits equal to the area, wbde.  The retailer earns profits
equal to area, p2 abw. With promotion the retailer agrees
to sell at p1 and the manufacturer lowers the wholesale
price to w1.  The retailer participates in the trade
promotion because its profits, area p1fiw1, are greater
than its non-promotion profits, area p2abw.
Manufacturer profits under promotion are area w2ige,
which is larger than non-promotion profits, wbde.
Under the trade promotion scenario both the
manufacturer and retailer share the increased profits due
to the elimination of double marginalization.  Exactly
how much each gets depends on their bargaining ability,
which is a function of their knowledge.  The
manufacturer knows its costs, and in the U.S. with
access to IRI or A.C. Neilsen scanner data, knows
demand conditions as well.  Manufacturers probably
benefit most from promotions.
Why, one might ask would one not see a permanent
trade promotion, i.e. EDLP, since it improves both
players profits?  Technically one should in fact observe
such.  One could argue that this is evidence against
successive monopoly, however other factors are clearly
at work.
One other factor is the retailers option to do private
label.  That strategy can dominate participation in a trade
promotion.  A retailer is not going to participate
permanently in a trade promotion because it kills its
private label program, a program that captures a higher
share of the channel's profits.  If the retailer can
introduce a private label product of equal quality and
consumer acceptance, i.e. a product that destroys all
manufacturer brand equity built up due to advertising,
product trademarks, and design, the retailer can
appropriate all of the profits earned at p1q1 in Figures 2
and 3.  Private label products, however, rarely are so
successful that they eliminate manufacturer brands.
Nonetheless, they clearly diminish national brand
pricing power (Cotterill et al. 2000).  Trade promotion
by manufacturers reduces the incentives for development
of private labels, and the amount of brand equity that
manufacturers have created also affects retailer's ability
to introduce private label products. One cannot analyze
private label pricing or trade promotions in a vacuum.
The rapid growth of private label products in the 1990’s
is in large part due to the problem of successive
monopoly in the food system.
Having dismissed EDLP as a failure due to its
inability to solve channel coordination problems during
the 1990's, looking forward things may be different if
WalMart continues its advance.  WalMart does a
permanent trade promotion, i.e. it is EDLP.  Research is
needed on WalMart's pricing practices, however it
appears that they assume the channel captain role and
dictate terms to manufacturers.  Walmart's EDLP prices
are at or near the single monopoly level on a permanent
basis.  Walmart and its suppliers seem able to give up
the merchandising excitement and the communication of
price cuts that stop-go trade promotions offer.
This is due in no small part to Walmart's reputation
as a no frills, no bull (trade puffery) retailer.  Their
procurement strategy in meat for example, vertically
forecloses the market in a fashion that reduces the need
for trade and consumer marketing programs (costly
competition) by meat processors and increases processor
margins.  Walmart (at least in New England) carries only
Purdue fresh chicken, only Tyson frozen chicken and
only Smithfield fresh pork.  These vertically coordinated
meat firms with branded products do not have to
compete with unbranded meats or each other in the case
of chicken.
7. An Out of the Box Solution:  Truly National
Supermarket Chains
Moves to improve channel coordination and pricing
efficiency such as trade promotions, ECR, category
management, and copycat private label programs are “in
the box” solutions.  They don’t challenge the structure of
the food-marketing channel, essentially leaving the food-
manufacturing firms intact and in control of the content
of the system.  Although U.S. supermarket chains are
larger in absolute size than their European markets
counterparts, and they dominate regions of the U.S.
comparable in size to many European countries, unlike
many European supermarket chains they have not
established themselves as channel captains by instituting
strong retail brands via supply chain management
programs.
14  In the U.S. this is an “out of the box” move
                                               
14 Cotterill (1997) discusses this option and whether developed
nations’ food systems might converge to it.  See Wrigley
(1999), a leading British geographer, for a very interestingDynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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that would diminish the position and stock market value
of large U.S. food manufacturers.  The breakfast cereal
industry has experienced a very strong taste of this since
1993 (Cotterill, 1999b).  Box 1 provides the executive
summary from a very insightful paper written by
Richard Bell, Institute of Retailing, Oxford University
that focuses on the current status of European food
distribution.  Leading supermarket chains in Europe are
clearly the channel captains, and their market power
continues to increase.  Leading manufacturer brands no
longer automatically command distribution.  Retailers
are branding their stores and their own label lines.  In the
U.S. even Walmart has not yet aggressively pursued this
strategy.  National brands, cheap, has been their primary
focus to date.
The next phase in the U.S. food system may well be
the harbinger of such a radical shift in economic
fortunes.  That phase could be the emergence of truly
national supermarket chains, something never seen in the
U.S.  In the near future, we undoubtedly will see more
mergers among the top 10 supermarket chains.  Since
this is an “out of the box” solution, lets speculate on
some feasible geographic combinations that would
assemble truly national chains with significant national
market shares. If Kroger, Safeway, Winn Dixie and
Shaws (Midwest, West, South, and Northeast)
combined, the resulting company would be truly national
in scope with sales of $86.4 billion and a national market
share of 21.5%.
15  A second combination could be
Albertsons, Ahold, Food Lion, and Meijer (West, East,
South and  Midwest).       It  would  have  sales  of  $77.9
Box 1:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE CHALLENGE
OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION (IN EUROPE)
1. The process of distribution has developed from a conduit
between the functions of production and consumption to a
position where it exerts considerable influence on both the
process of production and the pattern of consumption.
2. Product brand owners can no longer presume that
numerical distribution will occur automatically given
brand awareness and product acceptance.
3. The structure of retailing in most countries of European
Union countries is largely oligopolistic and the level of
concentration continues to increase.
4. Information technology, led by epos data, has enabled
retailers to integrate the process of distribution and
                                                                                 
European perspective on the transformation of U.S. food
retailing.
15 The 1999 market shares for this exercise are from Cotterill
(2000).
reverse the supply chain from producer push to consumer
pull.
5. Retailers are now vertically integrated with dedicated
distribution systems substantially replacing the role of the
wholesaler. This has further disadvantaged small retailers,
and created an effective entry barrier.
6. Retailers are now seeking strategic alliances to allow
them to maximise the utilisation of their logistics
infrastructure and their buying power. The UK and US are
now experiencing horizontal integration of the
replenishment process.
7. Food retailers have developed large surface out of town
sites which have increased consumer search costs. Each
site contains just one food retailer thus minimising the
opportunity for consumers to compare prices. The
combined effect of these developments is a reduced
ability for the consumer to switch between stores and, as a
consequence, a greater willingness to purchase substitute
products.
8. Grocery retailers are developing their chains into retail
brands thus differentiating themselves from their
competitors. The manifestation is the growth of private
label products and increased selective listing of branded
items. The effect is reduced head-to-head price
competition.
9. The benefit of product branding is that the manufacturer
has controlled most of the down and up stream variables
through the bond of the brand with the consumer.
Retailers now control the in-store marketing levers and
act as gatekeeper to the consumer. This, together with
their up-stream control, weakens the control of the
product brand owner.
10. The manufacturer is now confronted by:-  the conflicting
demands of individual retailer driven supply chains; the
loss of control of the in-store marketing levers (for which
category management is a partial response); a situation
where the customer is also competitor (through private
label); and an adverse tilting in the balance of information
availability.
11. Patterns of ownership and financial control of many
continental European retailers preclude them from
achieving all of the benefits of vertical integration that are
available to Walmart and leading British food retailers.
They are thus disadvantaged as Walmart enters European
markets.
12. New channels of distribution are opening, driven by
changes in consumer lifestyle and developments in
information technology. The pace of development is
retarded by site availability (partially through the land
planning process) and the practical difficulties of
delivering perishable items for daily consumption via the
Internet.
13. Competition authorities are taking an increasing interest
in the oligopolistic structure of food retailing; but their
criteria is consumer welfare rather than producer
protection.
Source: Bell, 2000.Dynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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billion and a national market share of 19.3 percent.
These two mammoth chains would account for slightly
over 40 percent of supermarket sales.  Walmart’s much
ballyhooed expansion by building supercenters is trivial
in comparison.  A third combination could assemble
another 20 percent firm in response to these conjectured
consolidations.  These three firms plus a larger Walmart,
e.g. 10 percent SOM, based on only its food sales, would
put national four-firm concentration at 70 percent.
Today (Spring 2000) the top 4 chains (Kroger; Walmart;
Albertsons and Safeway) control 43% of supermarket
sales.  Add Royal Ahold and Del Haize and the top 6
control 52.6%.
16
Before discussing the impacts of this new higher
level of national concentration, one might ask would the
state and federal antitrust agencies allow such mergers?
Under the current guidelines and case law they probably
would because they are classified as market extension
mergers that have no impact on retail concentration in
local markets.  In other words they do not seem to effect
consumer prices.  This may very well be a faulty
conclusion.  There is a need for monopsony/oligopsony
merger guidelines to refocus the analysis on the supply
side of these mergers and their impacts upon farmers as
well as consumers.  For example, 6 firms that control
over 50% of the nation's supermarkets sales, are
absolutely critical to the performance of a food product
that seeks nationwide distribution.  Buyer concentration
may affect performance at levels well below the seller
concentration cutoffs in the horizontal merger
guidelines.  Barriers to entry in this national buyers
market are clearly higher than they are in any local food
market.  Finally the pricing dynamics of the procurement
market can spill over to affect competition in retail
markets.
The recent rise in "slotting fees" is an example of
how buying power affects retail prices.  Many analysts
regard slotting fees as rent for scarce shelf space.  This
approach, however essentially assumes no retail buying
power.  Clearly this is not the case.  Firms with a large
share of the national market or regional firms can extract
slotting fees because manufacturers have no other
channel to a major share of consumers.  If markets were
competitive slotting fees would be minimal and at best
cover only the cost of adding and possibly withdrawing
a new product.
                                               
16 These spring 2000 shares are from Franklin (2000).
Recently Royal Ahold moved into the food service area by
acquiring the second largest firm, U.S. Foodservice, with $7.0
billion in sales (U.S. Foodservice).  Combined with its retail
sales of $20.3 billion in 1999, this clearly increases Royal
Aholds buying power.
Recently, the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) and
Wakefern Food Corporation, Elizabeth, New Jersey, the
nation’s largest retailer-owned cooperative wholesale,
petitioned the FTC on, these issue.  The AAI is
concerned that recent mergers have, in fact, generated
sufficient size disparity in the supermarket industry to
trigger Robinson Patman claims:
What we are calling the mega-chains–the five largest
retail grocery sellers–exercise enormous buying power,
which they employ against the food producers and
manufacturers.  The sheer size of the mega-chains looms
as a lever–the manufacturers must get their products onto
the shelves of the largest retailers, even if they have to
pay higher, even exorbitant, slotting and other allowances
and make other costly concessions–which they are forced
to do.  As a result, manufacturers may raise their prices to
all customers in order to earn an acceptable return on
investment.  In that case, all other customers subsidize the
mega-chains.  ...smaller customers are always at a
competitive disadvantage, because they are not receiving
the higher allowances and other concessions, which
effectively raises their cost of goods. (Foer, 1999, p.7)
The R-P Act may come to the forefront after decades
of relatively inactive and marginal enforcement.
17  It
gives retailers (read smaller ones) legal recourse against
manufacturers that grant discounts to other retailers (read
larger ones) that are not cost justified.  Under a
rejuvenated Robinson-Patman Act, manufacturers would
have three options: either give all retailers non-cost
justified discounts that large retailers demand, use the
“targeted marketing” programs of third party firms to
offer benefits to favored retailers, or give no discounts.
Examples of the second option include Catalina’s
check-out coupon program and Actmedia’s in store at
shelf coupon dispensing machines and Priceline.com's
web house grocery program.  These programs are chain
specific, i.e. they are not market wide such as a free
standing insert of coupons in a local newspaper.  Thus, a
manufacturer is offering a price discount only to
consumers who shop at a particular chain.  This
increases that chain’s movement and profitability but not
its competitors.  Any rejuvenation of the Robinson-
                                               
17 The AAI argument dovetails with the successive monopoly
model.  Slotting fees are not moves to eliminate double
marginalization.  To sustain monopoly at the retail level
leading supermarket chains prefer a system that limits the
competitive fringe.  To the extent that manufacturers raise
fringe supermarkets cost of goods sold relative to leading
supermarkets the power of the latter is enhanced (Salop and
Scheffman, 1987).  The practice also acts as a barrier to small
food manufacturers seeking to expand.  See Wier, 2000 for a
report on recent Senate hearings on slotting.Dynamic Explanation of Industry Structure and Performance Cotterill
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Patman Act will have to address the issue of access to
third party programs by independent operators and
smaller chains.
The last option (giving no discounts) may not be
sustainable in the long run if the truly national chains
can go out of the box.  They may develop strong retail
brands that supplant or at least significantly curtail time
honored manufacturer brands.  Leading manufacturers
and smaller retail chains would both lose position in the
food system.
Whether large chains can succeed in branding depends
upon the trade off between economies of specialization
versus economies of scope in branding food products.
As such it is a fitting end to this paper, a paper that
began with Adam Smith's observations on the economics
of specialization.
18 Does a company such as Kellogg’s or
Campbell’s have a competitive advantage in branding
new products in cereal or soups, or does a truly national
supermarket chain have the edge because of scope
economies?  If advertising is losing its punch due to new
technologies, then the era of branding food products
with TV media may be over (see Box 2). If a retailer can
establish a uniform high quality reputation across several
categories, the retailer name alone would be the brand,
and it would be transferable to new product categories
(Bell, 2000; Cotterill, 1997).
Box 2:  Goodbye to Advertising As We Know It
“Thanks to smart new VCR-like machines from Silicon
Valley, the viewer is king, media moguls are fretting, and
advertisers are terrified.  A DVR (Digital Video Recorder)
incorporates a hard-disk drive, a modem, and silicon circuitry.
It converts TV programs entering your home via cable,
satellite dish, or antenna into digital bits (up to 30 hours’
worth) that the hard drive can store for you to view at your
convenience… It’s a Trojan horse that could
surprise…advertisers with radical change…  That’s because,
yes, DVRs let you skip commercials with ease.  Forrester
Research of Cambridge, Mass., predicts that 13% of U.S.
households will have one by 2004, an adoption rate faster than
that of VCRs.”  (Schlender, 1999)
                                               
18 Economies of scale and scope in production and distribution
here, however, are not an issue.  Branded food companies, for
example, in fruits, vegetables and cheese have spun off
production to agricultural cooperatives.  They buy the product
as a graded commodity and then put their brand on it.
Supermarkets in Europe do the same with their supply chain
management approach.
Underlying this economy of scope argument is the
supposition that truly national chains could develop
extensive managerial cadre that could work with smaller
manufacturers in a supply chain management context to
produce and market truly innovative new foods and high
quality established foods.  Many of them may be fresh or
chilled or ready to eat prepared entrees.  Truly national
chains could make more effective use of TV media that
is segmented along demographic rather  than  geographic
lines.  These chains would not rely on leading
manufacturer brands to do category management.  Their
own management would do it.
Fundamentally, the battle for channel control distills
down to whether large old-line food manufacturers, or
new retailer “product development and marketing”
departments working with smaller possibly more
experimental and entrepreneurial food manufacturers can
be the most innovative and creative.  Adam Smith and
George Stigler could appreciate this 21
st century version
of the economic organization problem.
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Picture 1. The A&P Chain Store on Main Street, Mystic Connecticut, 1940.
Source: Mystic Connecticut Historical Society.Table 1:  Evolution of the Food Industries in the U.S. and Europe
Degree of
Competitive Control of supply marketing
Phase Structure Scope environment chain sophistication Consumer demand
I. The era of early Small-medium-sized Local/regional within Best example of Run by regional Limited branding, Food a major part of
Competition firms one country but for 'perfect' competition wholesalers mainly commodities disposable income -
1900-1920 commodity movement after farming, up to 50% in some
                                           entrepreneurial countries
II. National Rise of large Move to national/ 'Imperfect' Run by national Rise of national Rise in per capita
Consolidation manufacturers via major regional competition and manufacturers with branding, sales,income and demand
1920-1945 publicly owned level in one country start of acquisition wholesaler and advertising and  for wide range of
connections with Limited export activity.  Food retail chain support R&D private label branded convenience
many small processors manufacturing an appears foods
and retailers important factor in
national economies
III. InternationalizationMix of publicly owned Multinational Golden Age of  National Brand management Food expenditure
1945-1980 Manufacturing expansion of major manufacturer brandingmanufacturers at national and declines as
oligopolies, retailer manufacturers with and mass marketing. dominate but some international level. Percentage of
chains concentration, significant increase retail challenge Increased demand fordisposable income.
and many smaller in turnover resulting from market Move to larger retail
entrepreneurs concentration data/information outlets. Growth of
eating out
IV. Globalization Polarization of Manufacturers Retailer branding Supply chain in Major manufacturersTurnover in
1980-2000 manufacturing and extend globally and increases level of Europe run by identify core  foodservice now
retailer structures via retailers go penetration and retailers and categories. Super- challenging for
concentration, multinational begins to challenge challenging for stores, retailer leadership as slow-
acquisition and manufacturer dominance in North brands, address down in food sales
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Table 2.  Determinants of Economic Organization
Factor Impacts
Economic growth                                                        Increases specialization, incomes, and exchange,
Urbanization i.e. larger markets allow for the spin off of
Transportation new industries and new market channels
Communication
Technical progress in areas Lower costs of production, creates new products,
Including transport and improves quality of old, creates new industries
Communication                                                           and new market channels
Changes in culture, and social Creates a demand for new products and new
structure (changing role of men, marketing channels for distribution of old and new
women, children, minorities, products, affects the deployment of labor
seniors, and leisure time)
Deep, unfettered capital markets Strong drive for technical efficiency and market
power generates strategic moves: mergers,
acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, leveraged
capitalizations
Rise of particular organizations, Leads to vertical integration or coordination
e.g. tight oligopolies in one or
more stages of the market channel
Public Policy Antitrust policy seek to sustain the economic
organization that ensures benefits of technical
progress are passed on to consumers, and that
ensures effectively competitive prices
so that resources are allocated in a reasonably
efficient manner with the CAVEAT that farm
income be sustained at an acceptable level.Table  3. Cost Pass Through Rate Equations For Two Processors and Two Retailers:
Cost Pass Through Rates Vertical Nash Value if, Retail
Monopolies
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Source: Stigler, G. J.  1951. p. 187.
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Appendix
Stock Price Charts for Selected Leading Food Manufacturing,
Retailers and Internet Startups




















Philip Morris vs. S&P 500 Price Index 

















































S&P 500 Philip Morris
Nabisco vs. S&P 500 Price Index 





































































































Pepsico vs. S&P 500 Price Index 


















































Kellogg vs. S&P 500 Price Index 


















































General Mills vs. S&P 500 Price Index 

















































S&P 500 General MillsA-5
Danone vs. S&P 500 Price Index


















































Nestle vs. S&P 500 Price Index


















































Unilever vs. S&P 500 Price Index 


















































Safeway vs. S&P 500 Price Index 


















































Kroger vs S&P 500 Price Index 


















































Royal Ahold vs. S&P 500 Price Index 

















































S&P 500 Royal AholdA-8
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